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It has been argued in the literature that China is underurbanized in large part because of restrictions on 
migration. While the presence of migration barriers can help explain why existing cities fail to achieve 
their optimal size, it cannot explain the lack of cities. Although migration has become much easier over 
time, the number of cities in China has been rather stagnant. In this paper, we argue that lack of 
appropriate mechanisms for creating new cities is another reason for underurbanization. Under China’s 
hierarchical governance structure, the only way to create new cities is through the centralized policy of 
upgrading existing counties or prefectures into cities. However, in practice the implementation of the 
county-to-city upgrading policy was more complicated than expected. Based on a county-level panel 
dataset, this paper shows that jurisdictions that were upgraded to cities prior to 1998 do not perform better 
relative to their counterparts that remain to be counties in terms of both economic growth and providing 
public services. The policy was retracted in 1997, freezing the number of county-level cities since then. 
This, in turn, contributes to the observed underurbanization. 
 
 







1.  INTRODUCTION 
It has been argued in the literature that China is underurbanized, judged both by international comparison 
and by the efficiency standard.
1 One popular explanation is that China has various explicit and implicit 
restrictions on migration, which have delayed urban agglomeration (Au and Henderson 2006a, 2006b). 
However, migration has become much easier over time. In fact, many cities, especially small and medium 
ones, have loosened the household registration (hukou) system since the early 1990s (Rawski 2003). The 
increasing ease of migration should have helped the urbanization process. This suggests that there must be 
some other factors explaining China’s under urbanization.  
In this paper, we propose an alternative explanation for China’s underurbanization—the lack of a 
viable way of setting up new cities. In a democratic governance structure, cities will emerge and evolve in 
response to the pressure of population growth and industrial agglomeration.
2 China, however, has a 
hierarchical governance structure, under which neither the citizens nor the local governments have the 
discretionary power to create new cities. It is up to the central government that retains the ultimate power 
to decide which jurisdictions can achieve urban administrative status, which comes with more land quotas 
for city development. However, in practice, such a centralized process of awarding city status has proved 
to be more complicated than thought. 
From 1983 to 1997, the central government granted city status to more than 400 counties and 
prefectures. Although the central government set some minimum requirements to regulate upgrading, 
these official requirements were not enforced in the practice of county-to-city upgrading (Li 2007). 
Instead, the most important determinant of city status—and the associated political and fiscal benefits—
was local economic growth rate. Thus, upgrading mainly served as an incentive mechanism for local 
officials to develop the local economy. However, because the upgrading process was irreversible, once a 
city title had been awarded, the role of upgrading as an incentive instrument would no longer be 
applicable. As a result, the effect of the centralized city upgrading policy on urbanization and growth is 
likely to be questionable. To the best of our knowledge, no study has empirically examined this issue in 
the literature.  
Based on county-level data compiled from the local public finance statistical yearbooks and 
China 1990 and 2000 population censuses, we compare the performance of upgraded cities with their 
counterparts that remained counties using difference-in-differences (DID) method. To correct for the 
potential bias caused by anticipation effect and mean reversion in the DID estimation, we match cities 
with counties using propensity-scores of getting city status. We find that economic growth rates of newly 
established cities dropped from a high level to a normal level after upgrading. In addition, these new cities 
did not perform any better than the non-upgraded counties in terms of educational achievement, public 
health outcomes and living conditions. Although the ratio of population with an urban household 
registration status increased more quickly in cities, industrial employment and overall employment rate 
did not. The ratio of immigrants in total population was not significantly higher in cities, either. In 
summary, the centralized system of city creation did not achieve the goal of promoting urbanization. In 
large because of these problems, the policy of “county-to-city upgrading” was called off in 1997. Since 
then, new cities only appear at the prefecture level and the total number of cities has remained rather 
constant (Figure 1). The ineffectiveness of the upgrading policy before 1997 and the lack of new cities 
after that could largely contribute to the observed relatively low level of urbanization in China.  
 
                                                      
1 Chan (1994) and Zhang and Zhao (1998) describe in detail China’s urban population and urbanization level. Zhou and Ma 
(2003) compare China’s urbanization level with other countries. Sridhar and Wan (2007) find that China’s urbanization rate is 10 
percentage points lower than its industrialization level. The presence of a large number of dependents not being to unite with the 
migrant workers in cities indicates that urbanization lags behind industrialization in a real sense (Lu et al. 2007). For international 
comparisons on urbanization level, see World Bank (2008).  
2 For example, in the United States, a new city could be created by adopting a home rule charter. In Brazil, new 
municipalities are established through local voting.  
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Figure 1. Number of cities in China 
 
 
There is an emerging body of literature on China’s urbanization. For example, Anderson and Ge 
(2005) and Chen and Fu (2006) study the size distribution and growth pattern of Chinese cities. Au and 
Henderson (2006a, 2006b) and He and Zhou (2006) estimate the optimal size of cities. Deng et al. (2008) 
discuss the role of income growth in urban expansion. Zhang, Mount and Boisver (2004) analyze the 
relationship between urbanization and land use. However, the literature is largely silent on the 
institutional context of urbanization. By paying closer attention to institutional details, our paper offers a 
novel explanation to China’s under urbanization.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the background of 
granting city status in China. Section 3 describes the data and provides some descriptive analysis. Section 
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2.  COUNTY-TO-CITY UPGRADING IN CHINA 
China has three main levels of local administrative entities: province, prefecture (diqu), and county. Cities 
can exist at any level.
3 For example, a province and a municipality directly under the central government 
(zhixiashi) are both at the provincial level; a prefecture and a prefecture-level city are both at the 
prefecture level; a county and a county-level city are both at the county level. Upgrading thus refers to the 
reclassification from a county/prefecture into a city at the same level. (This paper focuses on the county-
to-city upgrading.) After upgrading, an entire county is labeled a city.
4 From 1983 to 1997, nearly 15 
percent of China’s more than 2,000 counties obtained city status in this way.  
There are two ways to achieve urbanization. One is to increase the size of existing cities, while 
the other is to form and develop new cities. In many developing countries such as Mexico and India, big 
cities are troubled by “urban problems” such as slums. For fear of instability caused by unemployment in 
big cities, China chose the latter strategy of urbanization, restricting the size of big cities and promoting 
small cities and towns.
5 Under this guidance, upgrading was adopted as the major policy of creating urban 
units in China. 
The policy objective of raising the number of small cities through upgrading is to speed up local 
economic growth, shifting surplus labor from rural areas to cities and reducing the rural-urban income gap 
(Kamal-Chaoui et al. 2009). By giving local governments more administrative authority and fiscal 
autonomy, the upgrading policy also intends to grant them more leverage for providing better public 
services.
6 
The official rule to regulate county-to-city upgrading first appeared in 1983, when the demand for 
city status increased in coastal provinces. This increase in demand was associated with rapid economic 
growth after economic reforms. Under some rough requirements proposed by the Ministry of Personnel 
and the Ministry of Civil Affairs, nearly 100 counties received city status between 1983 and 1986. As the 
number of cities continued to increase, the central government raised the minimum requirements for city 
status in 1986 and 1993, respectively. Table 1 summarizes the main minimum requirements on 
industrialization level, population engaged in nonagricultural activities, and fiscal strength that were 
announced in 1993. It is apparent from the table that the standard varies by population density. The entry 
barriers for counties with lower population density were set lower than those more densely populated 
counties.  
Although getting city status does not change a county’s rank in the administrative hierarchy, its 
government gains much more political power, which is why we use the term upgrading. For example, the 
party secretaries of many county-level cities can enter the standing committee of the prefecture-level 
party committee and enjoy a deputy-prefecture political rank. The administrative authority is also 
expanded in areas such as finance, trade, and transportation (see Table 2). For instance, Hubei province, 
has experimented with placing the budget of county-level cities under the direct supervision of the 
provincial government, thus bypassing the prefecture level.
7  
 
                                                      
3 For a detailed description of the Chinese city system, see Chung (1999). 
4 Similarly, during prefecture-to-city upgrading, the entire prefecture is labeled a city. From 1983 to 2001, more than 160 
prefectures in China were upgraded to prefecture-level cities.  
5 From the 1980s to the end of the 20
th century, China’s national urbanization policy tends to restrict the size of big cities. 
For example, the Eighth Five Year Plan for 1991-1995 states that the government should “control big cities, moderate 
development to medium-sized cities, and encourage the growth of small cities.” 
6 In the “Report on the Sixth Five-Year Plan” made in 1982, Premier Zhao Ziyang states that “Except for special cases, the 
administrative power of enterprises should be decentralized to cities, bypassing the central ministries and provinces. We should 
change cities, especially big cities, into open, multi-functional, modern economic centers and form an economic network that is 
based on big cities while including surrounding small cities and towns.” (Available at 
http://www.people.com.cn/zgrdxw/zlk/rd/5jie/newfiles/e1170.html) 
7 This is called "line item under province", or Shengji Jihua Danlie.  
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Table 1. Minimum requirements for county-to-city upgrading 
Population density (person/km
2)  >400 100–400  <100 
Percentage of counties in this category  25%  45%  30% 
Industrialization level  Industrial output value (yuan)  1.5 billion  1.2 billion  0.8 billion 
Share of industrial output value in gross value of 
industrial and agricultural output  80% 70%  60% 
Population engaged in 
nonagricultural 
activities 
Size of urban population (engaged in 
nonagricultural production  150k 120k  100k 
Share of urban population in total population  30%  25%  20% 
Fiscal strength  Fiscal revenue (yuan)  60 million  50 million  40 million 
Per capita fiscal revenue (yuan) 100  80  60 
Source: “The Report on Adjusting the Criteria for the Designation of New Cities.” Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1993; available in 
English in Zhang and Zhao (1998). 
Table 2. Benefits of being a city: an incomplete list 
Category Benefits  Source 
Tax and fee  Cities enjoy a higher urban construction tax (7% compared 
with 5% for counties) and could collect the surcharges 
levied on the issuing of motorcycle registration. In Liaoning 
province, cities could get 1 to 2 million yuan additional 
subsidies each year after upgrading. 
Chung and Lam (2004); Zhang 
and Zhao (1998) 
Land transfer  Cities generally convert more land to nonfarm use and 
retain a larger share of revenue from land sale. 
Zhang (2006); Ping (2006) 
Favorable policy  After achieving the status of “line item under province” 
(Shengji Jihua Danlie), cities could report directly to the 
provincial administration to ask for investment projects. 




Cities have more authority on foreign trade and exchange 
management; gains authority over police recruitment and 
vehicle administration; could establish the branch of custom 
and large state-owned banks; could approve projects with a 
higher cap of investment. 
Chung and Lam (2004); Du 
(1993) 
Government size  Cities could establish more branches of government and 
have a larger number of government employees. 
Ren and Wang (1999) 
Rank and salary  Sometimes the bureaucratic rank and salary of officials are 
raised after upgrading. 
Ren and Wang (1999) 
Reputation  Cities generally carry greater prestige and are more 
attractive to outside investors. 
Gu (1997); Chung and Lam 
(2004); Wang, Ji, and Lin (1998) 
Note: Given the volatility of Chinese policies, the benefits are continuously changing over time, and benefits listed are not 
necessarily effective during the same period. 
 
Table 2 lists other benefits associated with city status, among which the most prominent is that 
cities are granted more quotas to convert land from agricultural to nonagricultural use. Local governments 
obtain a huge amount of revenues from such land conversion (Lichtenberg and Ding 2009).  
These lucrative benefits enable the central government to use upgrading as an effective incentive 
instrument to reward localities with higher economic growth (Li 2007). However, because upgrading is 
irreversible and only provides a one-time incentive reward to localities for their past economic 
performance, the role of city status, once granted, will no longer be an incentive instrument. Thus, its 
long-term effects need to be examined.  
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3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Many of our outcome variables are from the 1990 and 2000 population censuses. Assembled at the county 
level, these censuses provide rich information on education, health, migration, urbanization, and 
employment in different sectors. Merging the two censuses together provides us with a panel data set with 
observations from both years (henceforth, “census data set”). Information on economic conditions and 
government activities, such as gross domestic product (GDP), fiscal revenues, and expenditures are from 
the annual series Public Finance Statistical Materials of Prefectures, Cities, and Counties 1993–2004 
(henceforth, “public finance data set”). Because this latter report only starts in 1993, we have dropped 
cities that were upgraded before 1994, because we lack data from their pre-upgrading period.
8 We have 
kept all counties in the sample as the control group. Jurisdictions that were counties before 1994 but were 
upgraded to cities from 1994 to 1997 form the treatment group (upgrading policy stopped in 1997). 
We first checked whether the requirements outlined in Table 1 have been strictly met in practice. 
As shown in Table 3, among the 99 cases of upgrading that took place in 1994–1997, only 6 meet all 
three requirements, 39 meet two, 30 meet only one, and 24 meet none. On the other hand, 36 counties did 
meet all three requirements but were not upgraded. This clearly demonstrates that the official 
requirements were not strictly enforced in practice.
9  
Table 3. Number of county-year observations by upgrading status and number of requirements 
satisfied (1994–1997) 
Number of requirements satisfied Total  0  1  2  3 
Non-upgrading cases  6,395  4,583  1,313  463  36 
Upgrading cases       99       24       30    39    6 
 
Given the large regional variation in development, it is important to know whether the degree of 
enforcement varies by region. To determine this, we divided the counties into three geographical regions 
(coastal, central, and western) and compared the degree of enforcement, as shown in Table 4. Two major 
findings emerge. First, the coastal region has more than twice as many upgrading cases as the western 
region, even though the coastal region has three-fifths as many counties. This suggests that the upgrading 
quota has not been distributed in proportion to the total number of counties in each region. Instead, 
economic growth might have played a key role in deciding which counties to upgrade. Second, whereas 
nonenforcement seems to be ubiquitous, it is more severe in the western region, suggesting that the 
chance of receiving a city status for counties in underdeveloped provinces may have exceeded what their 
economic performance deserved.
10 This is consistent with the fact that counties with lower population 
density—in particular in the western regions—were given lower upgrading requirements, suggesting that 
the central government took regional disparity into consideration when making upgrading decisions. 
Table 4. Number of upgrading cases that satisfied each requirement by region 
Region  Total cases  Industrial level  Urban population  Fiscal strength 
Yes No Yes No  Yes  No 
Coastal 49  31  18  34  15  8  41 
Central 30  15  15  14  16  5  25 
Western 20  5  15  11  9  3  17 
 
                                                      
8 To estimate the propensity scores of getting an upgrade in year t, data in year t – 1 were used. 
9 For a formal test on the nonenforcement of upgrading requirements, see Li (2007). 
10 Li (2007) provides more evidence that the upgrading policy may be biased in favor of western provinces.  
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Most outcome variables from the public finance data set are available for 1994 to 2004. Table 5 
lists the mean values for the treatment and control groups in 1994 and 2004. In total, 99 cities (labeled as 
“treatment group”) were upgraded from 1994 to 1997. 1,537 counties are also included in the table as 
“control group”. Growth rate is not listed in this table because we did not have a continuous measure from 
1994 to 2004. GDP data are not available before 1997, and gross value of industrial and agricultural 
output (GVIAO) is not available after 2000. Table 5 reveals several interesting observations. First, the 
number of public employees increases much more quickly in cities relative to counties. Second, the 
increase in the share of productive expenditure (basic construction expenditure plus expenditure 
supporting agricultural production) in total public expenditure seems to be slower in cities. Third, in 
2004, cities had much more extrabudgetary revenues and land revenue than counties.
11 
Table 5. Mean value of variables from public finance dataset 
 
Treatment group: City  Control group: County 
N=99 N=1537 
1994 2004 1994 2004 
Fiscal revenue (10,000 RMB)  6,355  15,720  2,358  5,683 
Public employee  13,112  17,263  9,010  1,1847 
Public employee per 100 people  2.2  2.8  2.8  3.5 
Fiscal revenue per public employee (10,000 RMB/person)  0.49  0.98  0.25  0.49 
Industrial and business tax (10,000 RMB)  6,522  9,337  2,294  3,470 
Industrial and business tax rate  5.11%  4.63%  7.83%  7.18% 
Agricultural tax rate  3.20%  3.30%  2.80%  3.10% 
Share of agricultural tax in total revenue  27.3%  18.5%  37.2%  26.5% 
Productive expenditure per capita (RMB)  22.7  76.8  188.4  126.8 
Share of productive expenditure in total expenditure  8.36%  9.07%  7.97%  10.96% 
Extra-budgetary revenues (10,000 RMB)    3,373    1,049 
Revenue from land (10,000 RMB)    1,465   542 
Note: All the output and revenue measures have been adjusted to 1993 constant prices using the annual GDP deflator. 
 
Table 6 lists the 1990 and 2000 mean values of variables from the census data set. We restricted 
the sample to those counties that appear in the empirical tests. There are a total of 95 cities and 1,001 
counties.
12 It is apparent from the simple means that the percent of population with urban household 
registration, the number of immigrants and the size of employment in the manufacturing and service 
sectors grew faster in cities than counties. In contrast, public service outcomes, such as education and 
crude death rate, differ little between cities and counties from 1990 to 2000. 
Because of the irreversible nature of city status, its role as an incentive instrument is abdicated 
once it is granted.
13 The weakening of this incentive after upgrading could result in slowing growth. The 
graph in Figure 2 compares the average growth rate of cities with that of counties. Because GVIAO was 
not available for after 2000, we have used the growth rate of GDP to show the trend from 2000 to 2004. It 
is easy to see that the growth rate of cities that were recently upgraded dropped sharply after 1997 and 
became normal relative to counties in following years. 
                                                      
11 Extrabudgetary revenues consist of all resources managed by administrative branches of the government outside the 
normal budgetary process, such as various fees, charges, and revenues from land leasing. They are controlled by the local 
government and are not subject to treasury management or budgetary oversight (Wong and Bird 2008). 
12 These observations are a subset of those in Table 3. We dropped those observations that lack full information to estimate 
their propensity score of being upgraded to cities in 1994–1997.  
13 No city has been downgraded to a county so far.  
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Table 6. Mean value of variables from population census dataset 
   
Treatment group: City  Control group: County 
N =95  N=1001 
1990 2000  1990 2000 
Population (1,000 people)         
Total  629 658  412 421 
> 6 yr  555  615  360  393 
> 15 yr  455  502  292  320 
Educational achievement 
% illiterate (among > 15 yr)  19.7% 8.1%  24.9% 11.2% 
% illiterate (male, among > 15 yr) 10.6%  3.9% 15.4%  6.5% 
% illiterate (female, among > 15 yr)  29.2%  12.4%  35.0%  16.1% 
% illiterate (among > 6 yr)  18.2% 8.7%  22.9% 11.6% 
% primary (among > 6 yr)  44.8%  40.5%  44.4%  41.6% 
% middle school (among > 6 yr)  28.2%  38.3%  24.9%  35.7% 
% high school (among > 6 yr)  8.1%  10.5%  7.3%  9.3% 
% above secondary(among > 6 yr)  0.7%  2.0%  0.6%  1.8% 
Health condition 
# of children born alive per woman  2.15   1.42   2.25   1.49  
# of surviving children per woman  2.02   1.40   2.07   1.45  
Crude death rate (deaths per 1000)  6.16  6.18  6.47  6.27 
Disabled  population  16.6k 21.9k  11.6k 14.5k 
Disability  rate  3.7% 4.3%  4.0% 4.5% 
Living condition 
Floor space per person (sq. meters)    24.4    22.4 
Urbanization 
% with urban household registration  14.7%  19.8%  13.1%  16.1% 
Immigration  
Total immigrants (1,000 people)  12.4   57.1   6.5   23.1  
Immigrants from other province  4.7   18.4   2.3   4.7  
Immigrants/total  population  2.49% 9.24%  2.25% 6.89% 
Total employment rate (among > 15 yr)  78.5%  79.8%  78.9%  82.4% 
By  occupation:       
Technician  3.5% 3.4%  3.5% 3.4% 
Government  agencies  1.1% 1.0%  1.0% 0.9% 
Office  workers  1.1% 1.7%  1.1% 1.4% 
Sales and service  4.2%  6.1%  2.9%  4.5% 
Agriculture  56.3% 46.5%  63.1% 55.9% 
Production 12.3%  12.0%  7.3%  7.3% 
Employment size by sector (1,000 people) 
Agriculture  275 237  197 183 
Mining  and  quarrying  5.1 3.7  2.3 1.8 
Manufacturing 39.7  50.9  13  15.5 
Electric, gas, water supply  1.25  1.87  0.57  0.92 
Construction 5.5  11.3  1.98  4.3 
Geology  and  water  0.63 0.37  0.36 0.21 
Transportation  and  storage  5.8 8.8  2.8 4.3 
Commerce 12.7  21.3  6.2  10 
Banking and insurance  0.95  1.48  0.57  0.78 
Real  estate  0.32 0.29  0.14 0.12 
Social service  1.70   5.70   0.86   2.50  
Health, sports  2.10   3.10   1.30   1.78  
Education and culture  6.69   7.82   4.40   4.84  
Research  0.18   0.18   0.09   0.10  
Government  5.19   6.89   3.32   4.20   
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Figure 2. Comparison of growth rates: cities vs. counties 
 
Note: This graph compares the average growth rate of the treatment group (jurisdictions that were upgraded from counties to 
cities during 1994–1997) and the control group (counties). GVIAO means the gross value of industrial and agricultural output, 
which measures the total economic activity when GDP data are not available.  
 
Figure 3 further depicts the growth rate trend for jurisdictions that experienced upgrading. The 
sample of this graph is larger than the treatment group defined earlier. This sample includes all the cities 
that were upgraded as early as 1985. Observations were regrouped according to the amount of since the 
year when upgrading occurred. Negative numbers on the horizontal axis represent years before upgrading 
(during which the cities were still counties), while positive numbers indicate years after city status was 
awarded. Both the raw average and the normalized average growth rate (the national average growth rate 
has been subtracted from each raw growth rate) are presented and they show the same pattern. It is 
apparent that in the years just before and during upgrading, the average growth rate of these jurisdictions 
was high; after upgrading, this rate started to drop; and two years after upgrading, it fell below the 
national average. After that, the average growth rate returned to the national average and stayed around 
there. In sum, after receiving city status and the accompanied benefits, cities did not sustain a higher 
growth rate than did counties.  
Figure 3 also shows that counties that eventually got an upgrade were not born with higher 
growth rates. Instead, higher growth rates are closely associated with the opportunity of getting an 
upgrade, suggesting that incentives play an important role in the fluctuation of growth rates before and 
after upgrading.  
Figure 4 compares the average growth rate of cities that met at least two requirements with those 
that did not at the time of upgrading. This comparison helps to explore the heterogeneity in the process of 
upgrading and to examine the impact of initial conditions on performance. It is not surprising that during 
the policy-affected period, meeting more requirements was positively correlated with higher growth. 
However, after 1997, these two groups did not show much difference in terms of economic growth. 
Having an initial higher industrialization level and more urban population did not guarantee higher 
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Figure 3. Growth rates of upgraded cities before and after upgrading 
 
Note: The horizontal axis represents the number of years since upgrading took place. 0 means the year of upgrading, –1 means 
the year immediately before the upgrading year, and 1 means the year immediately after. To get the normalized growth rate, we 
subtract the national average growth rate in the corresponding year from each raw growth rate and then calculate the average  
Figure 4. Growth rates of upgraded cities by number of requirements 
 
Note: This graph divides the jurisdictions that were upgraded to cities in 1994–1997 into two groups, according to whether they 
met at least two minimum requirements of city status (see Table 1) at the time of upgrading. GVIAO means the gross value of 
industrial and agricultural output, which measures the total economic activity when GDP data are not available.  
 
The implementation of the upgrading policy may have varied over time. For example, local 
lobbying may have become stronger, making it harder to enforce the requirements of upgrading. Thus, in 
addition to those that did not meet requirements, counties with less growth potential may also have been 
upgraded. Figure 5 compares the average growth rate of cities that were upgraded in 1994–1995 with 
those upgraded in 1996–1997. This comparison helps us determine whether the timing of upgrading 
matters to later economic performance. No significant difference is observed in the figure. Instead, the 
growth rate of both groups decreased after upgrading. In sum, all these figures display a common trend 
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4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGIES 
Difference-in-Differences Model 
Assuming that cities and counties have a parallel time trend for outcome Y, then a straightforward way to 
estimate the effect of city status on Y is a difference-in-differences model: 
01 2 3 * it i it it it Y Upgrade Post Upgrade Post          (1) 
where Upgradei is a dummy for upgrading that equals 1 if the county is upgraded to a city and otherwise 
equals 0; Postit is a dummy for the post-upgrading period that equals 1 for the years after the county is 
upgraded and otherwise equals 0; and the interaction term, Upgrade*Postit, equals 1 for upgraded cities in 
their post-upgrading years. Because each upgrading case happens in different years, Postit varies across 
cities and is not defined for counties. Thus, equation (1) must be modified before we can actually estimate 
it. We use a full set of year dummies to substitute Postit. This, however, will not affect the definition of 
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Y Upgrade year Upgrade Post    

    
 (2) 
In equation (2), β3 measures the average effect of city status on outcome Yit after controlling for 
pre-upgrading differences. This model could be applied to evaluate outcomes from both the public 
finance data set and the census data set, as long as that information is available in both pre- and post-
upgrading periods. For the public finance data set, we have annual data from 1994 to 2004; so, we can 
decompose the average effect of city status into dynamic effects of post-upgrading years. To do this, we 
replace the Upgrade*Postit dummy with ten dummies: Upgrade*Post0it, Upgrade*Post1it, … , 
Upgrade*Post9it. Among them, Upgrade*Post0it equals 1 for the year cities were upgraded, 
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Y Upgrade year Upgrade Post    

    
 (3) 
Where β30 measures the average effect of city status for the year of upgrading, β31 measures the average 
effect of city status for the first year after upgrading, and so on. Equation (3) allows us to detect the time 
pattern of the effect, such as immediate versus gradual and temporary versus permanent. 
The identification assumption for the DID method is that, in the absence of upgrading,  the 
treatment and control group are otherwise identical or at least have a parallel time trend in their outcomes 
over time. The most likely problem is that counties that anticipated being in the competition for city status 
may make some strategic preparations several years before submitting an application. Such preparations 
include (but are not restricted to) accumulating resources to achieve higher growth rates (or simply 
inflating the official figures of growth rates) in the years prior to application and expanding the number of 
urban household registration quota so as to inflate the size of urban population. If this is true, their 
performance will naturally return to the “normal” level after getting city status, which we call an 
“anticipation effect”. Another possible problem is mean reversion. Some counties may happen to grow 
faster than normal for a few years before the application for upgrading purely by luck. In this case, growth 
rates eventually will move back towards the mean or average.  Both the anticipation effect and mean 
reversion could bias our estimates toward finding a negative effect.  
In order to deal with these problems, we use propensity score matching methods to better 
compare upgraded cities with similar counties (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Dehejia and Wahba 1999, 
2002). We include various socio-economic indicators in the construction of propensity scores to control 
for the pre-upgrading differences between counties and cities. Assuming that the selection of upgrading is 




Propensity Score Matching  
















   (4) 
Where Upgradeit is a dummy indicating whether upgrading happens for county i in year t, G represents 
growth rate, and Z is a vector that includes variables appearing in the upgrading requirements, such as 
urban population, industrial output, and fiscal revenue.
14 The growth rate is included mainly to mute the 
estimation bias due to potential anticipation and mean reversion effect. We then use matching to combine 
counties and cities with different observed characteristics but the same propensity scores. The matching 
estimator is 
1 ˆ (, ) Matching i j
i county city j county






Where i represents those counties that were upgraded to cities from 1994 to 1997, j represents those that 
remain counties, and n is the number of upgrading cases. The match for each upgrading case i is 
constructed as a weighted average over the outcome of the control group j—counties. The weight, W(i, j), 
depends on the distance between the propensity scores for i and j. In this paper, we constructed the 
weights using a kernel function that is standard in the literature (Smith and Todd 2005). Compared with 
linear regression, matching does not need to impose a linear functional form on the model. 
We conduct difference-in-differences propensity score matching (Heckman et al. 1998; Heckman, 
Ichimura, and Todd 1998) if the outcome variable is available in both pre- and post-upgrading period 
(e.g., 1990 and 2000 in the census data). The estimator is defined as 
,2000 ,1990 ,2000 ,1990
1 ˆ () ( , ) ( ) DID Matching i i j j
i county city j county
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 (6) 
The difference between this DID matching estimator and the usual matching estimator is that this 
one allows for systematic differences between upgrading and non-upgrading outcomes after conditioning 
on observables. According to Smith and Todd (2005), the DID matching estimator generally performs 
better than cross-sectional matching estimators.  
                                                      
14 Here we use the growth rate in year t-1. We have also used alternative definitions of growth rate, such as average growth 
rates over three to five year period prior to the time of application. The results are similar. Due to page limit, they are not reported 




Difference-in-Differences Estimation  
Table 7 shows the DID estimation results based on equation (2). The outcome variables are from the 
public finance data set, including growth rate, fiscal revenue, number of public employees, fiscal revenue 
per public employee, share of productive expenditure in total expenditure, and share of agricultural tax in 
total revenue.
15 Table 8 further decomposes the average effect into effects in different post-upgrading 
years based on equation (3).  

























(1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
Upgrade 0.025  0.047  –0.026  6,023***  3,600***  0.406***  1.487**  –0.068*** 
 (0.027)  (0.037)  (0.030)  (909)  (615) (0.077)  (0.734) (0.014) 
Upgrade *Post  –0.027  –0.042  0.046  761* 1896***  –0.073  –2.862***  –0.047*** 
(0.030) (0.040) (0.034)  (390)  (457) (0.058)  (0.777) (0.016) 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.015  0.03  0.015 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.07  0.17 
N 11,183  10,634  10,873  20,215  20,195 20,190 11,412  19,985 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are in parentheses. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are represented 
by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Columns (1) through (3) show the results for the growth rate of gross value of industrial and 
agricultural output (GVIAO), industrial output, and agricultural output, respectively. Because these output 
values are not available for after 2000, we can only decompose the post-upgrading effect into the sixth 
year after upgrading. The results on the growth rate of total and industrial output are consistent with those 
shown in Figures 2 and 3—that is, growth rate decreased after a county was awarded city status. 
However, it is a little bit surprising that the growth rate of agricultural output increased after a county 
became a city. Whereas the overall effect is positive but not statistically significant, the decomposed 
effects are positive and statistically significant in the first and third year after upgrading. Theory suggests 
that the growth of a city is driven by agglomerative economies and spillovers in nonagricultural sectors. 
Our results, however, show that the formation of cities in China does not follow the usual urban growth 
practice. In China, city formation does not significantly affect the growth of industrial sectors. Instead, it 
shows an impact on the agricultural sector, which could be due to the uniqueness of China’s institutional 
arrangements.  
Column (4) of Table 7 shows that the average effect of city status on fiscal revenue is positive, 
with a magnitude of about 15 percent of the average value. The decomposed effects shown in column (4) 
of Table 8 display an interesting dynamic pattern over time—the pattern is negative in the first three years 
after upgrading and then becomes positive starting in the fourth year.  
As Luo and Zhang (2009) explained, under China’s centralized governance structure, the size of 
local government is largely in proportion to local population, unless there is a change in status from 
                                                      
15 It is possible that fiscal revenue and public employee follow log normal distributions, so that their log values are better 
dependent variables. We conducted robustness checks using their log values as dependent variables, and the findings are very 
similar. Because these variables are more meaningful in their levels, we have only reported estimates using their levels as 
dependent variables.   
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county to city. Column (5) of Tables 7 and 8 confirms the effect of such a change: There is an immediate 
increase in the number of total public employees immediately after upgrading that continues to grow in 
the post-upgrading period. The average increase is as large as 20 percent relative to counties. 

























(1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
Upgrade 0.025  0.047  –0.026  6,023***  3,600***  0.406***  1.487**  -0.068*** 
 (0.027)  (0.037)  (0.030)  (908)  (615) (0.077)  (0.739)  (0.014) 
Upgrade 
*Post0 
0.0023 –0.0039 0.043  –1,688*** 944*** –0.173*** –1.643***  –0.049*** 
(0.034) (0.045)  (0.048)  (515)  (313) (0.067)  (0.596)  (0.015) 
Upgrade 
*Post1 
–0.012 –0.045  0.091*  –1,381*** 805** –0.160**  –2.663***  –0.072*** 
(0.036) (0.047)  (0.046)  (488)  (404) (0.067)  (0.684)  (0.016) 
Upgrade 
*Post2 
–0.12** –0.103  –0.051  –1,352**  1,537*** –0.178*** –2.228***  –0.069*** 
(0.052) (0.059)  (0.051)  (654)  (419) (0.063)  (0.815)  (0.019) 
Upgrade 
*Post3 
–0.054 –0.036  0.107**  –385  1,968***  –0.151**  –2.358***  –0.061*** 
(0.039) (0.057)  (0.046)  (440)  (478) (0.059)  (0.805)  (0.019) 
Upgrade 
*Post4 
0.012 –0.055  0.014  331  2,015***  –0.112**  –2.635***  –0.052*** 
(0.044) (0.047)  (0.038)  (432)  (470) (0.048)  (0.860)  (0.017) 
Upgrade 
*Post5 
–0.019 –0.038  0.102*  688  1,977***  –0.073 –3.156***  –0.028* 
(0.054) (0.051)  (0.055)  (831)  (492) (0.064)  (0.937)  (0.017) 
Upgrade 
*Post6 
     1,704*  1,924***  –0.027  –3.160***  –0.036** 
     (941)  (525)  (0.061)  (0.918)  (0.015) 
Upgrade 
*Post7 
     2,321**  2,164***  0.029  –3.461***  –0.028* 
     (1055)  (587)  (0.069)  (1.006)  (0.017) 
Upgrade 
*Post8 
     2,673**  1,954***  0.065  –3.163***  –0.044** 
     (1115)  (614)  (0.080)  (1.029)  (0.020) 
Upgrade 
*Post9 
     4,060***  3,422***  0.059  –3.950***  –0.046* 
     (1503)  (928)  (0.078)  (1.075)  (0.027) 
Year 
dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.016  0.04  0.016  0.15  0.06  0.11  0.07  0.17 
N 11,183  10,634  10873  20,215  20,195 20,190 11,412  19,985 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are in parentheses. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are represented 
by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
The increase in fiscal revenue and public employees is consistent with the fact that local 
governments gain more administrative independence and discretionary power through upgrading. 
Analogous to firm managers who maximize their control rights, local officials prefer a larger government. 
A city status provides local governments with more discretionary power to expand government size.  
Fiscal revenue per public employee is used to measure the fiscal dependent burden (Zhang 2006). 
Lower fiscal revenue per public employee represents a weaker ability of the local government to support 
its employees, and thus a heavier fiscal dependent burden. With a huge increase in the size of public 
employees, it is interesting to know whether this burden becomes heavier after upgrading. Column (6) of 
Table 7 does not indicate any significant difference in revenue per public employee between cities and 
counties. But once decomposed into different years [Table 8, column (5)], it appears that the fiscal  
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dependent burden actually becomes more severe in the first seven years after upgrading, suggesting that 
the expansion of the number of public employees overshadows the increase in revenue, at least in the 
short term. 
Column (7) of Tables 7 and 8 examines how the expenditure is distributed into productive 
investment in agriculture and basic construction. We label this part of expenditure “productive” and 
classify the remaining part as “administrative costs of the government.” The negative estimate suggests 
that cities spent a smaller proportion on this part. Again, this may be largely due to the quick expansion of 
government size, which leads to an increase in administrative costs. 
Finally, column (8) of both tables shows a negative effect of city status on the share of 
agricultural tax in total revenue. This suggests that the focus of local government has shifted away from 
agriculture. In sum, Tables 7 and 8 are consistent with the proposition that a city status enables local 
governments to generate more revenues and inflate their size but does not guarantee a sustained high 
growth rate. 
Estimating Propensity Scores 
The results for the logit estimation of the propensity score are found in Li (2007). Figure 6 shows the 
histograms of the estimated propensity scores for counties (upper panel) and cities (lower panel). 
Following Smith and Todd (2005), we matched on the odds ratio of propensity score, P/(1–P), rather than 
on the propensity score, P, itself, so that the estimates are robust to choice-based sampling. The 
histograms of the log odds ratio are shown in Figure 7. These two figures give a graphical assessment of 
the extent of common support. It seems that the propensity scores have large overlap for cities and 
counties. In fact, only two cities do not have support in the counties; they will be excluded in matching. 




Figure 7. Histogram of log-odds ratio of propensity score 
 
 
To check whether the conditioning variables used to construct the propensity score in equation (4) 
satisfy the conditional independence assumption, we performed a balancing test. The general idea was to 
test for differences in these variables between cities and counties after conditioning on the propensity 
score. This paper follows Smith and Todd (2005) to conduct a regression-based balancing test for each 
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where P ö is the estimated propensity score. We then tested H0: γ0 = γ1 = γ2 = γ3 = 0. Failing to reject H0 
means that conditional on the polynomials of the propensity score, interactions of the treatment dummy 
with these polynomials have no additional impact on the conditioning variable. This suggests that the 
balancing condition is satisfied. The F-statistics for these tests are generally small, with p-values all 
greater than 0.1, suggesting that we cannot reject H0. In sum, both the histograms and the balancing tests 
indicate that the conditional independence assumption and common support conditions are satisfied. 
In estimating logit model (4) using data from 1994–1997, we obtained one propensity score for each 
jurisdiction-year observation. Thus, each county or city has multiple propensity scores. For a city, it is 
straightforward to keep the propensity score in correspondence with the treatment (i.e., the year when it 
was upgraded). For a county, propensity scores were kept for all four years and were treated as 
independent control observations in the actual matching. This allowed us to use all the information from 




Table 9 shows the propensity score matching results for three variables that are available only for the 
post-upgrading period. The first variable, floor space per person, comes from the census data set. The 
estimate is not significant, suggesting that cities do not outperform counties. The other two variables 
come from the public finance data set.
16 We found that extrabudgetary revenues are significantly higher in 
cities relative to counties. Given that under a city status, local governments have more discretion over 
revenue collection, it is not surprising that they extract more revenues from sources out of the budget.  
Table 9. Propensity score matching results 
 Coefficient  T-ratio 
Floor space per person in 2000  0.296  0.37 
Extra-budgetary revenues (1999–2004)  970  6.0 
Revenue from land (2000–2004)  333  2.4 
 
Another outcome variable is the revenue from land. According to Zhang, Mount, and Boisver 
(2004) and Ping (2006), since the 1990s, industrialization and urbanization have driven up the demand for 
land and have dramatically increased land value (Lichtenberg and Ding, 2009). Thus, local governments 
have a strong incentive to convert agricultural land into nonfarm usage in order to generate more 
revenues. The result on land revenue shows that increased administrative authority brought by city status 
was indeed accompanied by more revenues from land. 
Using DID propensity score matching method, we estimate the effect of city status on the change 
of values from 1990 to 2000. In addition, we performed a regression-adjusted matching, which controls 
for the same set of conditioning variables as in matching but uses a linear functional form. To do this, we 
ran an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the difference between 2000 values and 1990 values on 
the Upgradei dummy and all the conditioning variables used to construct propensity score in the logit 
model. Table 10 shows the estimated coefficients and corresponding t-ratios. The outcomes are grouped 
into four categories: public goods and services, urbanization, immigration, and employment. For level 
variables, we have presented the estimates on their log values.  
In terms of the provision of public goods, there is generally not much difference between counties 
and cities. The attending rate in secondary and above-level schools, the crude death rate, and the disability 
rate are not significant. In terms of (the reduction in) the illiteracy ratio, cities are doing even worse than 
counties, which could be caused by a lower initial value. The increase in the ratio of immigrants in total 
population is not significantly different between counties and cities. The percentage of population with an 
urban household registration status (hukou) grew faster from 1990 to 2000 in cities, which could reflect 
an expanded quota of urban household registration in cities. To shed light on the real urbanization level, it 
is necessary to examine urban employment, especially of those in the service sectors. We do find 
significant increase in the employment size of banking and insurance, real estate, health, education, and 
government in newly established cities. These results show that the title of city did bring some 
employment opportunity in some “modern” sectors. However, in many other sectors that are more 
important in terms of employment size, such as manufacturing, construction, transportation, and 
commerce, cities did not have a significantly larger increase in employment. Overall, the increase in the 
ratio of population being employed is not significantly different between counties and cities. The DID 
propensity score matching method even shows a negative coefficient for cities. In sum, these results on 
employment show that city status did not create more industrial sector jobs. 
 
                                                      











 coefficient  t-ratio  coefficient  t-ratio 
Education and health outcomes    
Illiteracy ratio (above 15 yrs)  0.0053  0.81  0.016  2.71*** 
Secondary and above education ratio (above 6 yrs)  –0.00086  0.58  –0.00026  0.14 
Crude death rate  0.010  0.11  0.10  1.16 
Disability rate  –0.0010  0.86  0.00037  0.33 
Urbanization and immigration        
Urban population ratio  0.0048  1.15  0.010  1.76* 
Immigrants ratio  0.0058  1.34  0.0048  0.79 
Employment        
Employment ratio  0.016  1.06  –0.0025  0.18 
Employment size by sector (1,000)         
Log(employment in agriculture)  –0.029  1.31  –0.044  1.55 
Log(employment in mining)  –0.22  1.64*  –0.11  0.99 
Log(employment in manufacturing)  0.069  1.26  0.066  1.24 
Log(employment in electricity and water supply)  –0.063  1.06  –0.070  1.27 
Log(employment in construction)  –0.026  0.30  0.025  0.29 
Log(employment in geology)  0.14  1.19  0.056  0.45 
Log(employment in transportation and storage)  –0.014  0.30  0.026  0.60 
Log(employment in commerce)  0.0060  0.17  0.018  0.48 
Log(employment in banking and insurance)  0.034  1.40  0.087  2.80*** 
Log(employment in real estate)  0.21  2.10**  0.089  1.05 
Log(employment in social service)  0.036  0.68  0.055  1.14 
Log(employment in health and sports)  0.071  2.50***  0.10  4.10*** 
Log(employment in education and culture)  0.027  1.00  0.057  2.83*** 
Log(employment in research)  –0.015  0.13  –0.077  0.67 
Log(employment in government)  0.067  2.14**  0.092  3.02*** 





Using county-to-city upgrading as an example, this paper proposes an important reason for the 
underurbanization in China—the lack of a viable way to create cities. We employed several empirical 
methods to estimate the effect of city status, including difference-in-differences, propensity score 
matching, and DID propensity score matching methods. Our results have confirmed the expansion of 
government revenue and public employees after localities achieve city status. However, the economic 
growth rate falls in newly upgraded cities. Moreover, city status does not yield better performance of local 
public goods and services provision than county status, and fails to generate an agglomeration effect in 
promoting urbanization. The reason for this could be a lack of appropriate local government incentives 
after awarding them city status. In addition to our political economic explanation, lack of agglomeration 
due to the small size of cities could be another reason for their bad performance. This upgrading policy 
was called off by the central government in 1997. Since then, no more county-level cities have been 
established. Tens of thousands of small towns below the level of county thus bear the responsibility of 
providing nonagricultural employment. Accordingly, it is even harder to generate the agglomeration 
effect of urbanization. Thus, the underurbanization that has occurred since then is of no surprise.
  
Without a viable way of creating cities, China’s urbanization process has slowed. Recently, 
promoting urbanization has been listed high on the policy agenda. The Eleventh Five Year Plan for 2006-
2010 placed strong emphasis on the development of metropolitan regions across China.
17 The 
conventional thinking is to continue promoting migration so as to achieve the goal of urbanization (World 
Bank 2008). Our findings show that the central government should also reform the local governance 
structure to allow for a more natural emergence of new cities, so that economic density could be increased 
according to market needs. The recent practice of allowing local governments to exchange some 
entitlements, such as staff quota of policy officers, between the developed and lagging regions is one such 
example (Luo and Zhang 2009). Given the strong need of urbanization, more indigenous institutional 
innovations are needed to find a viable way of creating cities, which would also provide compatible 
incentives to local governments. 
                                                      
17 Starting from the beginning of 2008, the “Urban and Rural Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China” was enacted, 
substituting the old “Urban Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China” that was enacted in 1990. The new law has dropped 
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